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DDAS Accident Report 
 
Accident details 
Report date: 15/05/2006 Accident number: 135 
Accident time: not recorded Accident Date: 10/12/1997 
Where it occurred: Alizai Village, Dand 
District, Kandahar City
Country: Afghanistan 
Primary cause: Field control 
inadequacy (?) 
Secondary cause: Inadequate training (?)
Class: Excavation accident Date of main report: [No date recorded] 
ID original source: none Name of source: MAPA/UNOCHA 
Organisation: Name removed  
Mine/device: PMN AP blast Ground condition: ditch/channel/trench 
dry/dusty 
hard 
Date record created: 13/02/2004 Date  last modified: 13/02/2004 
No of victims: 1 No of documents: 2 
 
Map details 
Longitude:  Latitude:  
Alt. coord. system:  Coordinates fixed by:  
Map east:  Map north:  
Map scale: not recorded Map series:  
Map edition:  Map sheet:  
Map name:   
 
Accident Notes 
inadequate investigation (?) 
inconsistent statements (?) 
long handtool may have reduced injury (?) 
partner's failure to "control" (?) 
request for machine to assist (?) 
squatting/kneeling to excavate (?) 
use of pick (?) 
visor not worn or worn raised (?) 
1 
inadequate training (?) 
 
Accident report 
At the time of the accident the UN MAC in Afghanistan favoured the use of two-man teams 
(usually operating a one-man drill). The two would take it in turns for one to work on 
vegetation cutting, detecting and excavation, while the other both rested and supposedly 
"controlled" his partner. 
An investigation on behalf of the UN MAC was carried out and its report made briefly 
available. The following summarises its content.  
The victim had been a deminer for five years. He had attended a revision course one month 
before, and it was 40 days since his last leave. The ground being cleared was described as a 
medium hard streambed on agricultural land. A photograph showed a steep sided gully 
perhaps a metre deep which appeared to be an irrigation canal (the banks were raised 
mounds) rather than a natural stream.  
The investigators decided that the victim found a detector reading, marked it, and started to 
excavate with a pick – contravening a UN MAC directive to stop using a pick for excavation. 
The mine was identified as a PMN (from "found fragments"). 
The photograph below shows the victim reproducing the position he was in at the time of the 
accident (taken by the researcher in July 1998). 
 
The Team Leader said the deminer was working properly because he was not badly injured. 
He thought that new equipment could make a repetition of the accident less likely. 
The Section Leader said the deminer was working properly and prodding with a bayonet. He 
said the back-hoe should be used when mines are deeply buried. 
The victim's partner said he was digging with a pick and working properly. He said the hard 
ground or a failure to mark the reading accurately might have caused the accident. 
 
Conclusion 
The investigators concluded that the deminer did not mark the detector reading properly. 
Further, the command group ignored procedure and allowed the pick to be used after its use 






The investigators recommended that the pick should not be used to investigate a reading 
point and that the demining group involved should "strongly advise" all their teams to stop 
such unsafe practices. 
Victim Report 
Victim number: 172 Name: Name removed 
Age:  Gender: Male 
Status: deminer  Fit for work: yes 
Compensation: not made available Time to hospital: not recorded 
Protection issued: Helmet 
Thin, short visor 
Protection used: Helmet, Thin, short 
visor 
 





See medical report. 
 
Medical report 
The victim's injuries were summarised as a "lower lip abrasion and deafness in both ears", a 
left ear drum perforation and a "painful" right ear.  
A medic's sketch indicated ear damage and a single fragment to his lower right jaw. A 
photograph showed no obvious injury.  
The doctor recommended that the victim be given one week off work. 
The insurers were informed on 11th December 1997 that the victim had suffered minor injuries 
to his lower lip in a mine accident. A claim was later submitted for "left eardrum perforation 
and deafness, injury to lower lip" and that he was not fit to return to duty with a hearing loss of 
20%. That claim was resubmitted on 12th May 1998, saying that the victim was off work until 
13th March 1998, when he returned to demining. 
No record of compensation was found in June 1998.  
 
Analysis 
The primary cause of this accident is listed as a "Field control inadequacy" because the 
victim's facial injuries indicate that his visor was worn (at least partly) raised and this error 
was not corrected.   
The UN MAC’s failure to issue coherent and consistent guidance on the use of the pick as an 
excavation tool may explain why it was used incautiously. The Victim cannot have been 
trained to use it appropriately without training guidelines. The secondary cause is listed as 
“Inadequate training”. 
3 
It is possible that the visor was too damaged to see through properly (as was seen frequently 
during 1998, 1999), in which case the failure to provide useable equipment may represent a 
serious management failing.  
The use of the pick and an upright position to "excavate" were both in breach of UN 
requirements, but not in breach of the demining group's unauthorised variations to those 
requirements.  The failure of the UN MAC to either listen to field feedback and adapt SOPs for 
local conditions, or enforce their own standards may be seen as a management failing. 
The agency that was used to make investigations for the UN MAC (based in Pakistan) at this 
time was frequently constrained by lack of funds, staff and transport. At times their movement 
was constrained by safety concerns. As a result, investigations were frequently delayed by 
weeks, meaning that an assessment of the site at the time of the accident was impossible.  
Gathering of further medical treatment and compensation details was prevented by the UN 
programme manager who denied all access to records in September 1999. Access has 
continued to be denied up to the date of completion of this version of the database. 
  
Related papers 
For the UN MAC, a senior Technical Advisor advised immediate release of an SOP for the 
use of the pick to initiate excavations on hard ground. A suitable SOP was drafted on 1st 
September 1997, but was still unreleased on 6th August 1998 [still not released in June 1999]. 
After ten weeks off work the victim returned to work as a deminer. 
The Victim was interviewed in July 1998 in Kandahar by the researcher. Working as a 
deminer again, the victim said he was checking an old irrigation canal with crumbled sides. It 
was dry and partly filled. The detector signalled and he marked the spot with three stones. He 
then dug forward from the third stone with a small shovel. He was digging to half a metre 
(18") deep. After a while he started to use the pick because the ground was too hard. He hit a 
PMN – believed to be a PMN because there were other PMNs found nearby. He was wearing 
a helmet and visor, which he believes saved his face. He suffered temporary hearing loss in 
one ear and was off work for ten weeks in all. 
He was photographed showing his position when the accident occurred.  
2000 MAC manager’s comment  
At the time, other TAs, [excised] personnel and MAC management staff did not agree with the 
TA who made the recommendation to release an SOP for use of the pick. Accordingly, NGOs 
were advised verbally and in writing that the use of the pick was not authorised….. Delays in 
issuing the final SOP were partly attributable to other competing high priority issues, lack of 
technical staff and a changeover of TAs in approximately Aug 98….   
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